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INTRODUCTION
Professor Geoffrey Stone’s Essay, The World of the Framers: A Christian
1
Nation?, seeks to state “the truth about . . . what [the Framers] believed, and
about what they aspired to when they created this nation.”2 Doing so will
accomplish Professor Stone’s main objective, helping us to understand what
“the Constitution allows” on a host of controversial public policy issues.3 Regrettably, Professor Stone’s effort is unsuccessful. Although he clearly tried to be
fair in his historical account,4 the Essay ultimately presents a misleading view
of the Framers’ perspective on the proper relationship between religion and
the state.

I.

PROFESSOR STONE’S THESIS

“[T]he point” of Professor Stone’s Essay is to use the Framers to offer
insight on what “the Constitution allows” on contested public policy issues.5
He begins his historical account with the claim that “modern-day Christian
evangelicals,” who “assert that the United States was founded as a ‘Christian
nation’” embodying the Puritans’ “rigidly theocratic” societal vision, are incor-

*
Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The author appreciates
the help of Lyman Johnson, Andrew McThenia, Winnifred Sullivan, and several family members,
with special thanks to Stephen Calhoun.
1.
Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2008).
2.
Id. at 26.
3.
See id. at 2, 25–26.
4.
See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
5.
Stone, supra note 1, at 25–26.
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rect.6 As proof, Professor Stone uses two main arguments. First, he makes a
general assertion that “the founding generation” was profoundly influenced
by deism, a “rational religion.”7 Deists “accepted the idea of a Supreme
Being,” but rejected “the Judeo-Christian God, who intervenes in human
history and listens to personal prayers.”8 Second, Professor Stone engages in
an extended evaluation of “the beliefs of five key members of the founding
generation: Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, George
Washington, and Thomas Paine.”9 Although acknowledging that these five
were not uniformly impacted by deism,10 the Essay’s bottom-line assertion is
that “[t]he significance of deism for the creation of the United States ‘can
hardly be overstated.’”11 Deism led the “founding generation [to view]
religion, and particularly religion’s relation to government, through an
Enlightenment lens that was deeply skeptical of orthodox Christianity.”12
While religion was valuable “in helping ‘to preserve the civil morality necessary to democracy,’”13
the Framers drew a sharp distinction in their understanding of the proper
relation between religion and law in a free society. . . . “[T]hey saw the
wisdom of distinguishing between private and public religion.” In
churches, temples, and homes, “anyone could believe and practice” what
he wished. But in the “public business of the nation,” it was essential
for the government to speak of religion “in a way that was unifying,
14
not divisive.”

How is the government to be “unifying, not divisive” in “speak[ing] of religion” on public matters? Professor Stone does not say, but the implication is
clear: government is divisive anytime it allows religion to leave its proper private sphere to intrude into the public arena.
6.
Id. at 3.
7.
Id. at 6.
8.
Id. at 6.
9.
Id. at 8. It is surprising that Paine is included in this group chosen for special study.
Although he played an important role as a pamphleteer, his stature as a Framer is far beneath the
other four. James Madison clearly would have been a better choice.
10.
See id.
11.
Id. at 7 (quoting FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF
RELIGION IN AMERICA 161 (2003)). Professor Stone says that “[t]o understand our national origins,
it is essential to understand that deism had a powerful impact on the colonies.” Id.
12.
Id. at 7–8 (quoting ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS
CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 24 (2005)).
13.
Id. at 24.
14.
Id. (quoting JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND
THE MAKING OF A NATION 22–23 (2006)). The Framers carefully distinguished between public and
private religion due to “their knowledge of the religious strife that had plagued man’s history and their
appreciation of the importance to individual liberty of both freedom of and freedom from religion.” Id.
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It is only in the Essay’s final paragraph that Professor Stone addresses
the constitutional impact of his “keep religion private” characterization of the
Framers’ view of religion. Instead of a discussion, he says only that this “truth
about the Framers” is helpful as we “consider whether the Constitution allows
the government to have faith-based initiatives, deny homosexuals the right
to marry, prohibit obscenity, forbid abortions, the use of contraceptives, or
stem-cell research, teach creationism, dip the flag to Jesus, or ban the word
‘fuck’ in public.”15 Professor Stone’s Essay does not explicitly state, but nonetheless implies, the direction in which our deliberations should be influenced
once we correctly understand the Framers—religion should be prohibited
from influencing public policy in these areas.16
This Response will argue that Professor Stone is wrong in arguing that
the Framers sought to bar religious influence from public policy disputes.
Despite his desire to communicate historical truth, his Essay falls short of this
goal. First, Professor Stone overstates the significance of deism in the
Founding Era by exaggerating both its strength and also the weakness of traditional Christianity. Second, the Essay virtually ignores what should have
been its chief historical inquiry—did the Framers, whatever their own religious
convictions, act in ways that kept religion private? By failing to acknowledge
the many intrusions of religion into the public sphere during the Founding
Era, the Essay distorts the Framers’ perspective on the appropriate place of
religious belief in public life.

II.

DEISM OVEREMPHASIZED

Professor Stone’s evidence for deism’s surpassing significance is flawed.
By his own description of their beliefs, some of which were indisputably deistic, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson do not belong in the “flat-out”
deist category to which Professor Stone assigns them.17 Deists thought that
God does not “intervene[ ] in human history,”18 yet Franklin believed that God
“‘governs the World by his Providence.’”19 Jefferson was “the primary drafter of
15.
Id. at 25–26.
16.
See id.
17.
Id. at 7.
18.
See supra text accompanying note 8.
19.
Stone, supra note 1, at 8 (citing Letter From Benjamin Franklin to Ezra Stiles (Mar. 9, 1790), in
3 THE LITERARY DIARY OF EZRA STILES 387, 387 (Franklin B. Dexter ed., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1901)).
There is other evidence that Franklin was not a “flat-out” deist. Deists deny a God who “listens to
personal prayers,” Stone, supra note 1, at 6, yet Franklin made an unsuccessful motion that the
Constitutional Convention begin each day with prayer. Mark A. Noll, Evangelicals in the American
Founding and Evangelical Political Mobilization Today, in RELIGION AND THE NEW REPUBLIC: FAITH IN THE
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the Declaration of Independence.”20 Professor Stone characterizes this
document as “a statement . . . of American deism,”21 but its language shows
the opposite to be true. If God does not interact with mankind, why did the
signatories appeal to the “Supreme Judge of the World” to vindicate their
honorable intentions, and also express confidence in “the Protection of divine
Providence”?22
Another way to overemphasize the impact of deism is to overstate the
decline of orthodox Christianity. Professor Stone does this in part by oversimplifying the record concerning the complex issue of George Washington’s
religious faith. A letter to Lafayette is quoted in which Washington said
that he was “‘no bigot . . . to any mode of worship.’”23 It is also claimed that
“Washington’s personal papers . . . offer no evidence that he believed in . . . Jesus’[ ]
divinity”24; that “[i]n several thousand letters, he never once mentioned
25
Jesus” ; and that, “[a]s president, Washington was always careful not to invoke
Christianity[, but h]is official speeches, orders, and other public communications scrupulously reflected the perspective of a deist.”26
Contrast this rendering with the fuller picture. Washington’s statement
to Lafayette is accurately related as far as it goes, but Professor Stone omits
the critical words that follow the quoted phrase: “Being no bigot myself to
any mode of worship, I am disposed to indulge the professors of Christianity in
the church, that road to Heaven, which to them shall seem the most direct

FOUNDING OF AMERICA 137, 137–38 (James H. Hutson ed., 2000) [hereinafter RELIGION AND THE NEW
REPUBLIC].
20.
Stone, supra note 1, at 13.
21.
Id.
22.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). Congress added this
language to Jefferson’s draft, PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE 148–49 (1997), but Jefferson signed the finished document. Moreover, other
evidence makes it clear that Jefferson personally believed in a God who intervenes in human affairs.
See infra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. Jefferson also believed in a God who answers prayers.
How else would one explain the conclusion to his Second Inaugural Address, in which he asked his
hearers to join him in supplications to
that Being in whose hands we are, who led our forefathers, as Israel of old, from their native
land, and planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life; who
has covered our infancy with his providence, and our riper years with his wisdom and power.
Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 339, 345 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
23.
Stone, supra note 1, at 17 (quoting Letter From George Washington to Marquis de
Lafayette (Aug. 15, 1787), in 29 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 258, 259 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)).
24.
Id. at 18.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 19.

Getting the Framers Wrong

5

plainest easiest and least liable to exception.”27 Professor Stone is correct to
suggest that had Washington been a committed Christian, one would expect
to find more references to Jesus and Christianity in his works. But Professor
Stone once again gives an incomplete account. First, at least one of his three
specific claims about Washington’s use of language is incorrect.28 Washington
as president did not “scrupulously reflect[ ]” a deistic perspective. In an
October 1789 Thanksgiving Proclamation, Washington referred to “Almighty
God,”29 hardly a “deistic phrase[ ],”30 and also urged that various “prayers and
supplications” be offered,31 a nonsensical entreaty had he shared the deistic
32
belief that God does not “listen[ ] to personal prayers.” Second, Professor
Stone ignores two public occasions when Washington did refer to Jesus. In
1779, General Washington urged the Delaware Chiefs “to learn our arts and
ways of life, and above all, the religion of Jesus Christ. These will make you a
greater and happier people than you are.”33 More importantly, Washington
ended his 1783 Circular Letter to the Governors of All the States on Disbanding
the Army by stating in his prayer for the Governors and their respective States
that
God would . . . dispose us all to do justice, to love mercy, and to demean
ourselves with that charity, humility, and pacific temper of mind, which
were the characteristics of the Divine Author of our blessed religion, and

27.
Letter From George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, supra note 23, at 259 (emphasis
added). This quote affords one small example of why assessing Washington’s personal faith is complicated.
I suggest in the text that the phrase, “professors of Christianity,” shows that Washington considered
himself to be a Christian. Others infer the opposite meaning. See PETER R. HENRIQUES, REALISTIC
VISIONARY: A PORTRAIT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 177 (2006) (the phrase suggests that Washington
“was an outsider to the faith”). What is free from doubt, however, is that Professor Stone should not
have omitted the phrase in quoting the letter to Lafayette. His readers should have been allowed to
form their own conclusions about its meaning.
28.
The first of Professor Stone’s claims about Washington—that his personal papers do not
show a belief in Jesus’ divinity, supra text accompanying note 24—may or may not be literally true.
It is clear, however, that on one significant public occasion Washington did refer to Jesus as divine.
See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
29.
Thanksgiving Proclamation (Oct. 3, 1789), in THE WASHINGTON PAPERS 302, 302 (Saul
K. Padover ed., 1955).
30.
Stone, supra note 1, at 19.
31.
Thanksgiving Proclamation, supra note 29, at 303. Washington says that these prayers
should be offered to “the great Lord and Ruler of Nations,” id., which might be considered deistic
language, but in the same paragraph refers to God as “Him” and “He,” which connote a more personal
conception of God.
32.
See supra text accompanying note 8. For other evidence that Washington believed in
prayer, see infra text accompanying note 34.
33.
GEORGE WASHINGTON, Speech to the Delaware Chiefs (May 12, 1779), in 15 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 53, 55 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1936).
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without an humble imitation of whose example in these things, we
34
can never hope to be a happy nation.

Professor Stone also stresses the weakness of traditional Christianity by
claiming that it was in “serious decline [during] the Revolutionary era.”35 He
proffers the fact that church membership had fallen to “‘not more than one
person in . . . ten,’”36 as well as the assertion that “[e]vangelicalism, as defined
by its contemporary exponents, played at most a ‘negligible role in the founding
era.’”37 Concerning the low rate of church membership, Professor Stone does
not reveal that his quoted source, Sydney E. Ahlstrom’s A Religious History of
the American People,38 explains low membership rates in a way that shows
that these numbers, in themselves, do not necessarily portend a decline in
39
Christianity itself. As for Evangelicalism’s asserted “‘negligible role in the

34.
Circular Letter to the Governors of All the States on Disbanding the Army, in THE
WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra note 29, at 204, 213–14. Professor Peter Henriques gives mixed signals
as to whether he thinks “Divine Author” in fact refers to Jesus. In the text of his recent book on
Washington, he states that the phrase “might well refer to Jesus, but may be a reference to Jehovah.”
HENRIQUES, supra note 27, at 175. In his Notes on Sources, however, he states that “it is logical to
assume it does refer to Christ.” Id. at 242 (internal citations omitted). In my mind, there is no
ambiguity. Washington’s encouragement to “us all” to follow the “Divine Author[‘s]” example can
only refer to Jesus, one who “lived for a while among us.” John 1:14 (NIV). It is also worth noting
that here Washington also refers to Jesus’ divinity.
35.
Stone, supra note 1, at 4.
36.
Id. (quoting SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
365 (1972)). Ahlstrom actually says that “church membership had dropped . . . [to] not more than
one person in twenty or possibly one in ten.” AHLSTROM, supra. It is thus probable that the church
membership rate was 5 percent and only possibly approached 10 percent. Professor Stone did not even
mention the lower figure, but instead edited Ahlstrom’s language to reflect the very highest
percentage of church membership that it would support. This is a good example of a fair scholar at
work. Although Professor Stone no doubt intended to be fair throughout his Essay, there nonetheless
are other instances in which his use of authority risks misleading his readers. See, e.g., supra note 27
and accompanying text; infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
37.
Stone, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting Noll, supra note 19, at 146).
38.
AHLSTROM, supra note 36.
39.
Professor Ahlstrom lists such factors as pastors dispersed by the War and a people made
apathetic about religion due to “preoccup[ation] . . . with the problems of politics.” Id. at 36, at 365.
In fairness to Professor Stone, I must point out that Ahlstrom does say that “[t]he revolutionary era
was a period of decline for American Christianity as a whole,” id., language that seemingly provides
strong corroboration for Professor Stone’s thesis. Ahlstrom’s assertion, however, is principally
defended by recounting a decline in the churches. See id. at 365–66. Again, this does not necessarily
connote a decline in the Christian faith itself. Moreover, the main objective of Professor Stone’s
argument is to show how profoundly American culture had changed from the time of the 1639
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, which said that government should be “‘established according
to God’” and establish an official state church supported by taxes, Stone, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting
THE FUNDAMENTAL ORDERS OF CONNECTICUT (1639), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
HISTORY 23 (Henry S. Commager ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts 7th ed. 1963)), to the time of the
U.S. Constitution, which “made no reference whatsoever to God.” Id. at 5. The example of the
1780 Massachusetts Constitution undermines Professor Stone’s argument. See infra notes 56–62 and
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founding era,’” Professor Stone relies upon Professor Mark Noll, who wrote to
show that Evangelicalism—a particular manifestation of Christianity—however
important in our day, was not influential in “the 1770s and 1780s.”40 Although
Professor Stone uses language that technically says no more than this,41 the
quote ends a three-sentence paragraph in which the main point is the decline
of Christianity as a whole.42 The suggestion is that this “serious decline” led to
Christianity’s, not just Evangelicalism’s, “‘negligible role.’” Professor Noll’s
article offers no support for this conclusion. In fact, a few pages before the
language relied upon by Professor Stone, Professor Noll states that “Christian
faith of a generally Protestant variety played a large part in the founding era
of the United States.”43
Beyond the specific factual errors in Professor Stone’s case for deism’s
surpassing importance in the Founding Era, one wonders why he makes the
argument at all. After all, the Essay is not a sociological work aimed simply at
cataloguing the religious beliefs of the Framers. Instead, it seeks to advance a
particular view of what they believed to be the proper relationship between
religion and the state. Professor Stone claims that the Framers believed religion should be kept in its proper private sphere. Does the fact that some of
them were deists corroborate this assertion? Not at all. Even if it could be
shown that all were “flat-out deists,” that fact, standing alone, would offer
no support to Professor Stone’s claim. The Framers’ religious beliefs, in themselves, are irrelevant.44 What is needed is specific evidence showing they
wanted to keep religion out of public life. Professor Stone’s Essay provides
none. In fact, the Essay focuses so much on religious beliefs per se that it barely
addresses the historical question actually relevant to its principal claim.

accompanying text. Finally, even if Christianity was in serious decline throughout the Founding Era,
Professor Stone’s thesis is not necessarily proven. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
40.
Noll, supra note 19, at 146.
41.
See supra text accompanying note 37.
42.
See Stone, supra note 1, at 4–5.
43.
Noll, supra note 19, at 139. Even the alleged “negligible role” of evangelicals is not free
from doubt. It may all come down to how one defines evangelicalism, a question beyond the scope of
this Response. Suffice it to say that Thomas Buckley argues that “members of evangelical churches”
played the pivotal role in a critical event of the Founding Era—the defeat in Virginia of a proposed
general tax assessment for the benefit of religion and the 1786 passage instead of Jefferson’s Statute
for Religious Freedom. THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA,
1776–1787, at 175 (1977). “The key to understanding the nature of the religious settlement in Virginia
rests with [the evangelicals], for they wrote and signed the overwhelming majority of the memorials which
engulfed the legislature . . . and their representatives provided the votes in the Assembly which determined
the outcome.” Id.
44.
Professor Stone asks his readers to draw a fallacious inference—that non-orthodoxy in
Christian beliefs inevitably leads one to oppose religious influence upon public policy.

8
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III.

RELIGION WAS NOT SOLELY A PRIVATE MATTER TO
THE FRAMERS

Professor Stone makes no real attempt to convince his readers that
the Framers intended to restrict religion to the private sphere. He simply
makes this assertion.45 The Essay offers no convincing corroborating evidence. Instead, it presents only a miscellany of scattered statements of weak
probative value.
Some of Professor Stone’s statements are too vague to be useful. For
example, what is meant by saying that the “Framers viewed ‘issues of religion
and politics through a prism’ that was highly critical of what they saw as
Christianity’s historical excesses and superstitions[ ]”?46 Even if true, this claim
offers no detail on what the Framers believed about Christianity’s—much less
47
religion’s in general—proper relationship to law. It certainly does not substantiate Professor Stone’s thesis that the Framers would restrict all religion to
the private sphere.
Professor Stone does make the more specific claim that “[l]ong before
the American Revolution, the Puritan vision of a unified and orthodox religious community had proved unattainable.”48 Professor Stone encapsulates
this “Puritan vision” of a “rigidly theocratic societ[y]” in the phrase, “‘Christian
49
nation.’” He cites the language of the U.S. Constitution as proof that the
Framers did not intend “to establish a ‘Christian nation,’ but rather to create
a secular state.”50 Professor Stone is correct that the Framers did not intend a
“Christian nation,” i.e., a “rigidly theocratic societ[y].” But there is a very
large gap between this fact and Professor Stone’s broader assertion that they
wanted to confine religion to “churches, temples, and homes.”51 Consider, for
example, that the same Virginia Assembly that in 1786 “passed Jefferson’s
45.
See supra text accompanying note 14. Even though Professor Stone quotes Jon Meacham
in making his “keep religion private” assertion, see supra note 14, Meacham actually disagrees with
Professor Stone’s ultimate conclusion: “The wall [of separation] Jefferson referred to is designed to
divide church from state, not religion from politics.” MEACHAM, supra note 14, at 19.
46.
Stone, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting LAMBERT, supra note 11, at 161); see also text accompanying
note 12.
47.
The same thing can be said for one of John Adams’s statements quoted by Professor
Stone: “‘I mix religion with politics as little as possible.’” Stone, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting Letter
From John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Apr. 12, 1809), in THE SPUR OF FAME: DIALOGUES OF JOHN
ADAMS AND BENJAMIN RUSH, 1805–1813, at 142 (John A. Schutz & Douglass Adair eds., 1966)).
The context for Adams’s remark is to explain why, in an earlier letter to Rush, Adams had quoted
only Cicero, not Job and St. Paul, as an example of the point he was making. See id.
48.
Id. at 3.
49.
See id.
50.
Id. at 5.
51.
See supra text accompanying note 14.
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[Statute for Religious Freedom] also passed a statute requiring the observance
of Sunday as a day of rest.”52 Thomas Buckley writes that
[t]his legislation inaugurated a series of so-called blue laws which
would keep government firmly enmeshed in the business of religion.
Ostensibly designed for the benefit of the whole community, and
without reference to particular creeds or religious systems, they were in
reality meant to impose the beliefs and values of the dominant
53
Protestant churches upon the inhabitants of the state.

Equally unsupportive of Professor Stone’s thesis is his assertion that John
Adams “was acutely aware of the need to separate religion from politics.
‘Nothing,’ [Adams] wrote, ‘is more dreaded than the national government
meddling with religion.’”54 This quote on its face reveals the narrow focus of
Adams’s dread—the national government’s “meddling with religion.” Thus,
Adams was not even talking about the general relationship between religion
and law, much of which, of course, is implemented by state and local governments. Moreover, the letter’s context shows that Adams’s concern was
narrower still. The quoted sentence is part of a paragraph in which Adams
relates to Benjamin Rush the alarm caused by suspicions “that the
Presbyterian Church was ambitious and aimed at an establishment as a national
church.”55 Professor Stone also does not reveal that while Adams feared an
established church at the national level, he had no such qualms about religious
establishments at the state level. Adams was the principal draftsman of the
1780 Massachusetts Constitution, a document that David McCullough calls
“one of the most admirable, long-lasting achievements of . . . Adams’s life.”56
The Preamble referred “to the constitution as ‘a covenant’ or ‘compact’
between the people and God.”57 The language bespoke a “covenant ceremonial
liturgy, rooted in the Hebrew Bible and in a New England tradition going
back to the Mayflower Compact of 1620.”58 The Declaration of Rights,
which followed the Preamble, “affirmed the ‘duty’ of all people to worship
‘The Supreme Being, the great creator and preserver of the universe.’”59 The
52.
WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: AMERICA’S FOUNDATION IN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 48 (2003).
53.
BUCKLEY, supra note 43, at 181–82.
54.
Stone, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting Letter From John Adams to Benjamin Rush (June 12,
1812), in THE SPUR OF FAME: DIALOGUES OF JOHN ADAMS AND BENJAMIN RUSH, supra note 47, at 224).
55.
Letter From John Adams to Benjamin Rush, supra note 54, at 224.
56.
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 220 (2001).
57.
John Witte, Jr., “A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of Religion”: John Adams and the
Massachusetts Experiment, in RELIGION AND THE NEW REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 1, 19.
58.
Id.
59.
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 56, at 221–22. The constitutional convention altered this
language to make worshipping God “a right of all men, as well as a duty.” Id. at 224.
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Constitution also required that both the Governor and Lieutenant Governor
“‘be of the Christian religion.’”60 Even more significantly, the Constitution,
61
in language not drafted by Adams but supported by him, also stipulated “the
payment of religious taxes in support of congregational ministers.”62
One statement offered by Professor Stone might initially seem sufficient
in itself to substantiate his “keep religion private” characterization of the
Framers’ perspective: Thomas Jefferson was “deeply committed to the separa63
tion of church and state.” No elaboration is provided as to what this concept
meant to Jefferson. Maybe Professor Stone assumed that everyone would know
what “separation of church and state” entails. The “separation” concept, and
in particular Jefferson’s metaphor of a “wall of separation,” has achieved iconic
significance in the public mind and in constitutional law.64 Discerning
Jefferson’s intended meaning, however, is complicated.
Jefferson used his “wall of separation” imagery in an 1802 letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association.65 He apparently never used it again.66 Professor
Daniel Dreisbach argues that “Jefferson’s ‘wall,’ . . . was a metaphoric construction of the First Amendment, which governed relations between religion
and the national government. His ‘wall,’ therefore, did not specifically address
67
relations between religion and state authorities.” This interpretation not only
is corroborated by the text of the letter,68 but also by Jefferson’s own conduct.
Thus, although Jefferson as President refused to issue “executive proclamations

60.
Witte, supra note 57, at 10.
61.
Id. at 10–11, 24.
62.
Id. at 10. It is curious that McCullough does not mention this provision in discussing “notable
changes” to Adams’s draft made by the convention. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 56, at 224–25.
63.
Stone, supra note 1, at 12.
64.
See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 1–8 (2002); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 1–9 (2002).
65.
HAMBURGER, supra note 64, at 1 & n.1. The phrase appears in a very long sentence in
the second of the letter’s three paragraphs:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that
he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of
government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence
that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should “make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”
thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.
Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in DREISBACH, supra
note 64, at 148.
66.
DREISBACH, supra note 64, at 54. There thus “is little evidence that Jefferson thought
this figure of speech expressed a universal principle, encapsulated the most salient features of his
church-state views, or was his definitive word on the First Amendment.” Id.
67.
Id. at 50.
68.
See Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 65.

Getting the Framers Wrong

11

recommending religious observances,”69 as Governor of Virginia “he issued a
proclamation appointing ‘a day of publick and solemn thanksgiving and prayer
to Almighty God.’”70 The key question, however, is whether Jefferson intended the “wall” imagery to suggest that religious influence should be barred
from public policy debates. Many have interpreted the “wall” to mean precisely this—that people have no right “to bring their distinct religious views
to bear on politics.”71 Does Jefferson support them?
The answer is irrefutably “no.” First, Jefferson’s Danbury letter spoke of
a “wall” between church and state, not religion and the state.72 Using
“‘church,’ rather than ‘religion,’ . . . emphasized that the constitutional separation was between ecclesiastical institutions and the civil state.”73 This
language would have appealed to the “New England Baptists [who] framed
their agenda in terms of disestablishment, but . . . did not want religious
influences separated from public life and policy.”74 Second, Jefferson brought
his own religious beliefs “to bear on politics.” In the early 1780s he proposed
slavery’s gradual abolition.75 Why? In part because,76 as explained in his
77
Notes on the State of Virginia, written in 1781–82, he feared that otherwise a

69.
DREISBACH, supra note 64, at 65.
70.
Id. at 59 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving
and Prayer (Nov. 11, 1779)). He also supported Madison’s unsuccessful efforts to have a bill enacted
that not only authorized Virginia governors “to designate days for thanksgiving and fasting and to
notify the public by proclamation,” but also imposed a fine upon ministers who refused to participate
without reasonable excuse. Id.
71.
HAMBURGER, supra note 64, at 484; see DREISBACH, supra note 64, at 2, 7.
72.
Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 65.
73.
DREISBACH, supra note 64, at 51. It is important to keep in mind that “the civil state”
Jefferson had in mind was the federal government. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the letter’s focus was on the government’s potential interference with “faith” and “worship,” not
on the church’s potential influence on the government. See Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Danbury
Baptist Association, supra note 65.
74.
DREISBACH, supra note 64, at 51. In this they were no different from the Virginia evangelicals
who were instrumental in passing Virginia’s 1786 Statute for Religious Freedom. See supra note 43.
The evangelicals “endorsed [that Statute] in terms of their own freedom but at the same time pressed
for laws designed to enforce a style of public morality and life dictated by and expressive of their own
particular religious beliefs.” BUCKLEY, supra note 43, at 181.
75.
JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 145 (1996).
76.
Joseph Ellis writes that Jefferson acted because he believed that slavery was incompatible
“with the principles on which the American republic was founded.” See id. at 145–46. This is
undoubtedly true, but what were those principles? Jefferson’s Declaration declared that the Creator
made men equal and endowed them with inalienable rights. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776). To be motivated by this belief in the realm of law is to bring religious faith “to
bear on politics.”
77.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 163 (William Peden ed.,
1955) (1787).
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just God “by supernatural interference” would assist the slaves in gaining their
freedom by the “extirpation” of their masters.78

CONCLUSION
It has been shown that the actual history of the Founding Era does not
substantiate Professor Stone’s claim that the Founders meant to separate
religion from politics. One should not be surprised, for human nature would
make any such separation impossible. Professor Stone concedes that virtually
all the Founders, traditional religionists and otherwise, believed that religion
was valuable in fostering “civic virtue,”79 keeping alive “‘the best sense of
80
moral obligation,’” and confining persons “‘within the bounds of social
81
duty.’” It is completely unrealistic to think that a religious person’s sense of
right and wrong could ever be completely cabined within the private sphere.
Is a person of faith to care about virtue only when dealing with a neighbor
across one’s back fence? Can religious citizens reasonably be expected to have
82
no interest in broader societal issues that implicate justice? The answer is
“no,” and American history manifests their concern. As powerfully expressed
by Professor William Miller:
The separating of church from state certainly has not meant—despite some shrill cries that it should—the separating of religion from
politics. Far from it. Churches and churchgoers have been active in
American politics and social policy on explicit religious grounds from
the American Revolution through the abolition movement and
the Civil War and the Social Gospel and the gospel of wealth and the
Prohibition movement and the pacifist movement and the Civil
Rights movement . . . and a great deal I am leaving out . . . . There are
protests, but the pattern is that one objects to religion in politics
when one disagrees with the political position taken but endorses it when

78.
See id.
79.
Stone, supra note 1, at 22.
80.
Id. (quoting Philips Payson, A Sermon, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING
THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760–1805, at 523–29 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., Liberty
Press 1983)).
81.
Id. at 23 (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Stand, No. III (April 7, 1798), in 21
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 402, 405 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974)).
82.
Professor Stone notes that Thomas Jefferson agreed with John Adams that “the essence of
sound religious belief [is to] ‘be just and good.’” Stone, supra note 1, at 17, 14 n.102 (quoting Letter
From John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 12, 1816), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS: THE
COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS
499 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1987)). It is unrealistic and unfair to expect religious citizens to confine
their concerns about justice to the private sphere.
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one agrees with that position—a “moral” issue is then discerned, and
83
religion-in-politics is then not only acceptable but altogether fitting.

Professor Stone’s cry for separating religion from politics is not “shrill.”
Still, his Essay suggests that he is among those who have only a selective
aversion to religious influence in public affairs. Consider again the list of
public policy issues that concern him.84 All of them relate to the conservative end of the political spectrum. Where are civil rights, animal rights, the
nuclear freeze, environmental protection, and other typically liberal issues
that attract the involvement of religious citizens?85 Moreover, why refer only
to forbidding abortions, when some citizens support abortion rights for religious reasons?86 A categorical objection to religious influence in public policy
87
disputes, while more logically consistent, would still be historically
indefensible. Admittedly, a short essay cannot be expected to give a comprehensive account. Still, an author can reasonably be held to a “no distortion”
standard. Professor Stone’s Essay unfortunately does not meet this test.
A final point must be made. Even though the ultimate goal of the Essay is
to make an argument about what role the Constitution permits religion to play
in public policy disputes, Professor Stone ignores a key source of insight—the
United States Supreme Court. The Court has repeatedly said that no constitutional violation occurs from the fact that a governmental action implements
a policy that coincides with a religious belief.88 These decisions repudiate the
83.
MILLER, supra note 52, at 247.
84.
See supra text accompanying note 15.
85.
One wonders what Professor Stone thinks of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who clearly was
motivated by his Christianity. See Samuel W. Calhoun, May the President Appropriately Invoke God?
Evaluating the Embryonic Stem Cell Vetoes, 10 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 1, 19–22 (2008). And
would Professor Stone have objected to the “Protestant ministers in New England and New York,”
who in the 1850s “preached over 3,200 sermons in the space of only six weeks” in opposition to the
“Nebraska Bill, which left open the possibility of slavery in the Kansas and Nebraska territories”?
HAMBURGER, supra note 64, at 244–45. And what about the “more than 3,000 New England
clergymen [who] signed a memorial to Congress” protesting the Nebraska Bill as “‘a great moral
wrong . . . and exposing us to the righteous judgments of the Almighty’”? Id. at 245 (quoting Protest
of 3,050 New England Clergymen (Mar. 1, 1854), in DAVID CHRISTY, PULPIT POLITICS; OR
ECCLESIASTICAL LEGISLATION ON SLAVERY 598, 598–99 (Negro University Press 1969) (1862)).
86.
One outlet for such citizens is The Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights.
87.
To be consistent, Professor Stone would have to object to President Obama’s March 2009
lifting of the federal ban on funding of embryonic stem cell research, as the President’s motivations
were partly religious: “As a person of faith, I believe we are called to care for each other and work to
ease human suffering.” President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signing an Executive Order Removing
Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem Cells and a Memorandum on
Scientific Integrity, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc., 2009 DCPD No. 00135 (Mar. 9, 2009) (available at
http://gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/index.html).
88.
See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604 n.8, 605 (1988) (rejecting a facial challenge to
the Adolescent Family Life Act); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319–20 (1980) (upholding
abortion funding restrictions); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (upholding a
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Essay’s message that the Constitution bars religious influence on issues of public
policy.

Sunday closing law). As the Court stated in Harris, “[t]hat the Judaeo-Christian religions oppose
stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal Government may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny.” 448 U.S. at 319. A showing that the overlap of
religious and secular values was not entirely coincidental, for example, that Jews and Christians had
worked zealously to criminalize stealing, presumably would not make such laws unconstitutional.

